• Awesome Ethereum Cutting Edge
  • Ethereum
  • Recommended
  • Incentives in Computer Science
  • Financial Computing
    • Encryption Content (zk, obvram, circuts, smpc, etc)
      • MPC videos
  • MEV
    • MEV Ship Vault
    • Miscellaneous Gems
    • Garbled circuits
    • LEGO
  • Full Table for Sufficient Values of Whale Transaction

Tim Roughgarden's lectures

MIT Open Course: Blockchain and Money

Stanford Center for Blockchain Research

Stanford Blockchain Club and its online seminar and activities

Tim Roughgarden's Youtube short course on incentives in CS

UCL Financial Computing and Analytics Group

Fedor Iskhakov's Lecture in ANU

1. The 1st BIU Winter School SECURE COMPUTATION AND EFFICIENCY
2. The 5th BIU Winter School ADVANCES IN PRACTICAL MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION
3. Simons Securing Computation Workshop
4. Simons Cryptography Boot Camp
5. DIMACS/Columbia Data Science Institute Workshop on Cryptography for Big Data
6. DIMACS/MACS Workshop on Cryptography for the RAM Model of Computation
7. DIMACS/MACS Workshop on Usable, Efficient, and Formally Verified Secure Computation

• A performance benchmark on mempool services
• Escaping the Dark Forest
• Ethereum is a Dark Forest
• Ethereum Blockspace - Who Gets What and Why
• Ethology: A Safari Tour in Ethereum’s Dark Forest
• Five theses about transaction ordering, MEV, and front-running
• Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges
• Flashbots: Frontrunning the MEV Crisis
• Frontrunner Jones and the Raiders of the Dark Forest: An Empirical Study of Frontrunning on the Ethereum Blockchain
• Front-Running as a Service
• Gas Gambits — Game Theory Example of Incentivized Collaboration
• High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain Exchanges
• RETURN TO THE DARK FOREST
• MEV Auction: Auctioning transaction ordering rights as a solution to Miner Extractable Value
• MEV and Me
• MEV auctions considered harmful
• MEVA (What is it good for?)
• On the instability of Bitcoin without the block reward
• Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How dark is the forest?
• Quantifying MEV
• Staring Into the Monster’s Eye: Analyzing a Generalized Front-Running Ethereum Arbitrage Bot Attack
• Surrogeth: Tricking frontrunners into being transaction relayers
• The enemy of your enemy is NOT your friend
• To Sink Frontrunners, Send in the Submarines
• Uncle Bandit Attack
• What Is Miner-Extractable Value (MEV)?
• Wrecking sandwich traders for fun and profit

### Flashbots Resources:
Flashbots Medium
Flashbots EthResearch post
Research roadmap
Research Fellowship

Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges by Daian et. al.

High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain Exchanges by Zhou et. al

Fair Sequencing Services: Enabling a Provably Fair DeFi Ecosystem by Juels et. al. (Chainlink)

MEV Auction: Auctioning transaction ordering rights as a solution to Miner Extractable Value by Karl Floersch (Optimism)

Blinder: MPC Based Scalable and Robust Anonymous Committed Broadcast by Ittai Abraham et. al.

Time, clocks, and the ordering of events in a distributed system by Leslie Lamport

On The Instability Of Bitcoin Without The Block Reward by Carlsten et. al.

SoK: Transparent Dishonesty: Front-running Attacks on Blockchain by Eskandari et. al.

MEV auctions considered harmful by Ed Felten (Offchain Labs)

Order-Fairness for Byzantine Consensus by Kelkar et. al.

Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange Using Trusted Hardware by Bentov et. al

Submarine Sends by Breidenbach et. al.

TEX – A Securely Scalable Trustless Exchange by Khalil et. al.

Spam resistant block creator selection via burn auction by Barry Whitehat

Ethereum is a Dark Forest by Dan Robinson

Escaping the Dark Forest by Sam Sun

Dark Forest Escape Route Starkware whiteboard session video recording

ETHOnline - 'Phil & Georgios Talk Miner Extractable Value'

IC3 Blockchain Camp 2020 - Phil Daian - "DeFi Composability - Friend or Foe?"

Gas Wars: Understanding Ethereum’s Mempool & Miner Extractable Value by Uncommon Core podcast

The Alchemy of Hashpower (Part II) by Leo Zhang

Exploring DeFi Trading Strategies: Arbitrage in DeFi by Alex Obadia

How to munch on pickles from a whale dinner by Tomasz Mierzwa

Portion of Daily Gas Used by [[Backrunning]] Bot Contracts by Phillipe Castonguay

Gas Gambits - Game Theory Example of Incentivized Collaboration by KeeperDAO

Phantom TX: a dark pool for Ethereum transactions

Candyshop: a smart transaction batching service that extracts value by controlling transaction ordering

Scrooge-McEtherface: attack tool that loots Ether from vulnerable smart contracts

Surrogeth: Tricking frontrunners into being transaction relayers

B.Protocol: A Decentralized Backstop Liquidity Protocol

Gas Now (Sparkpool): ETH Gas Price quotation system based on Pending transactions

Blocknative Mempool Explorer

Geth Wiki

What diagrams exist to illustrate the Ethereum blockchain creation process?

1. An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries, 2017 paper
2. Billion-Gate Secure Computation with Malicious Adversaries, 2012 paper
3. Secure Two-Party Computation via Cut-and-Choose Oblivious Transfer, 2011 paper
4. Fast Cut-and-Choose-Based Protocols for Malicious and Covert Adversaries, 2013 paper
5. Two-Output Secure Computation with Malicious Adversaries, 2011 paper
6. Efficient Secure Two-Party Computation Using Symmetric Cut-and-Choose, 2013 paper
7. Amortizing Garbled Circuits, 2014 paper
8. Non-Interactive Secure Computation Based on Cut-and-Choose paper

1. LEGO for Two-Party Secure Computation, 2009 paper
2. MiniLEGO: Efficient Secure Two-Party Computation from General Assumptions, 2013 paper
3. TinyLEGO: An Interactive Garbling Scheme for Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation, 2015 paper
4. Constant Round Maliciously Secure 2PC with Function-independent Preprocessing using LEGO, 2017 paper

source

The value of 𝛿 (whale attack premium) that makes whale mining more profitable than honest mining, as a function of the lead of the original branch at the start of the race phase z, Alice’s mining power 𝛼 (rows), and m’s mining power 𝛽𝑚 (columns). For 𝑧=0, 𝛿 is always equal to 0.

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