vexctl is a tool to apply and attest VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) data. Its purpose is to "turn off" alerts of vulnerabilities known not to affect a product.

VEX can be though as a "negative security advisory". Using VEX, software authors can communicate to their users that a vulnerable component has no security implications for their product.

To achieve its mission, vexctl has two main modes of operation. One helps the user create VEX statements, the second applies the VEX data to scanner results.

VEX data can be created to a file on disk or it can be captured in a signed attestation which can be attached to a container image.

The data is generated from a known rule set (the Golden Data) which is reused and reapplied to new releases of the same project.

# Attest and attach vex statements in mydata.vex.json to a container image:
vexctl attest --attach --sign mydata.vex.json cgr.dev/image@sha256:e4cf37d568d195b4..

Using statements in a VEX document or from an attestation, vexctl will filter security scanner results to remove vexed out entries.

# From a VEX file:
vexctl filter scan_results.sarif.json vex_data.csaf


# From a stored VEX attestation:
vexctl filter scan_results.sarif.json cgr.dev/image@sha256:e4cf37d568d195b4b5af4c36a...

The output from both examples willl the same SARIF results data without those ulnerabilities stated as not explitable:

{
  "version": "2.1.0",
  "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/sarif-2.1.0-rtm.5.json",
  "runs": [
    {
      "tool": {
        "driver": {
          "fullName": "Trivy Vulnerability Scanner",
          "informationUri": "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy",
          "name": "Trivy",
          "rules": [

We support results files in SARIF for now. We plan to add support for the propietary formats of the most popular scanners.

Assessing impact is process that takes time. VEX is designed to communicate with users as time progresses. An example timeline may look like this:

1. A project becomes aware of CVE-2022-12345, associated with one of its components.
2. Developers issue a VEX data file with a status of under_investigation to inform their users they are aware of the CVE but are checking what impact it has.
3. After investigation, the developers determine the CVE has no impact in their project because the vulnerable function in the component is never executed.
4. They issue a second VEX document with a status of not_affected and using the vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path justification.

vexctl will read all the documents in cronological order and "replay" the known impacts statuses the order they were found, effectively computing the not_affected status.

If a sarif report is VEX'ed with vexctl any entries alerting of CVE-2022-12345 will be filtered out.

To build vexctl clone this repository and run simply run make.

git clone [email protected]:chainguard-dev/vex.git
cd vex
make

./vexctl version
 _   _  _____ __   __ _____  _____  _
| | | ||  ___|\ \ / //  __ \|_   _|| |
| | | || |__   \ V / | /  \/  | |  | |
| | | ||  __|  /   \ | |      | |  | |
\ \_/ /| |___ / /^\ \| \__/\  | |  | |____
 \___/ \____/ \/   \/ \____/  \_/  \_____/
vexctl: A tool for working with VEX data

GitVersion:    devel
GitCommit:     unknown
GitTreeState:  unknown
BuildDate:     unknown
GoVersion:     go1.19
Compiler:      gc
Platform:      linux/amd64