Alongside the implementation of cryptography in hardware and software, attacks on those implementations (plus associated countermeasures) form a central challenge in cryptographic engineering. This topic is sometimes termed physical security, but, either way, it contrasts sharply with traditional cryptanalysis by targeting the concrete implementation (vs. the abstract design, i.e., the underlying theory) via techniques such as side-channel attack. Beyond the obvious motivation, there are many position statements, e.g., see [1,2,3], that outline why this challenge is important. Thus, from an educational perspective, the question is how to equip students with an appropriate, associated skill set?

On one hand, it seems obvious a hands-on approach is preferable: this is an applied topic so actually doing it (assuming a background in the underlying or related theory), e.g., via Problem-Based Learning (PBL), would be most effective. Indeed, other initiatives have already used a similar approach, e.g., see [4]. However, on the other hand, our experience is that some practical and/or logistical challenges remain. In particular, a PBL-based approach will demand some "problems" and, potentially, infrastructure for students to use. This facts act as a driver for the SCALE project: the goal is to provide a suite of material related to side-channel (and fault) attacks that is

• low-cost (i.e., has few if any barriers to use),
• accessible (i.e., offers a balanced, configurable difficulty level, between real-world and educationally focused examples),
• relevant (e.g., addresses modern challenges with tangible value and impact),
• coherent (e.g., well documented and supported), and
• effective (i.e., elicits appropriate learning outcomes).

Over time, SCALE has evolved in different directions; the content is therefore captured by material in several repositories. Each one is organised as a submodules:

• The sw sub-module houses the software-oriented material: the goal is to provide a set of high-level, CTF-like exercises that offer controlled, simulated environments in which to learn about various attack techniques.

• The hw sub-module houses the hardware-oriented material: the goal is to provide a set of low-level, concrete hardware platforms that are tailored toward learning about side-channel attacks based on power analysis.

• The data sub-module houses the data-oriented material: the goal is to provide some (pre-acquired) data sets, each relating to one of the platforms in the hardware-oriented material but that can be used without physical access to the associated hardware.

This means each one is motivated per the above, but differs in terms of focus and content. Since they remain somewhat independent, they can be selectively populated and used:

• Clone the repo.

  git clone https://github.com/danpage/scale.git ./scale
  cd ./scale

• Either

  • populate all content via

    git submodule update --init --recursive

    or

  • populate some content via

    git submodule update --init --recursive sw
    git submodule update --init --recursive hw
    git submodule update --init --recursive data

    selectively removing commands to reflect the content you need.

This ability can be important: the size (and thus download time) of the data-oriented material is significant, for example, and it will not be applicable in all contexts or to all users.

1. S. Ravi, A. Raghunathan, P.C. Kocher, and S. Hattangady. Security in embedded systems: design challenges. ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS), 3(3), 461--491, 2004.

2. S. Ravi, P.C. Kocher, R.B. Lee, G. McGraw, and A. Raghunathan. Security as a new dimension in embedded system design. Design Automation Conference (DAC), 753--760, 2004.

3. W. Burleson, O. Mutlu, and M. Tiwari. Who is the major threat to tomorrow's security? You, the hardware designer. Design Automation Conference (DAC), 16:1--16:5, 2016.

4. F. Bruguier, P. Benoit, L. Torres, and L. Bossuet. Hardware security: From concept to application. European Workshop on Microelectronics Education (EWME), 2016.