Update sites should be https about groovy-eclipse HOT 10 CLOSED

Do you expect the redirect to be https as well?

I do. Here's the attack, which isn't very difficult if I had a few weeks to invest in spearfishing a specific company:

• I know foocorp uses groovy-eclipse
• I setup a wifi network near their office or coffee shop with the same name
• I pass all their traffic through unaltered, except groovy-eclipse jars. I can't see or alter your https requests, but I can fake the responses to your http requests and you have no way to tell.
• I replace your groovy-eclipse jars with malicious ones: https://github.com/mveytsman/dilettante

from groovy-eclipse.

@JLLeitschuh Yes, I know. I updated the urls that had available https support. I'm not entirely sure the springsource maven repo is even used anymore. If it is, it's part of the deployment, so you could generate an update site from the git repo securely. Pivotal is investigating.

from groovy-eclipse.

+1 for this; our security group takes a dim view of download sites without TLS/SSL and no other cryptographic way to authenticate file integrity, e.g., PGP signatures

There are way too many examples of where exploits have been distributed when proper precautions aren't taken...

from groovy-eclipse.

Just FYI, download.eclipse.org started to support https in Nov 2018 (bug #444350). Hopefully we'll be able to uplevel security across the eclipse community.

from groovy-eclipse.

Quick update from Andy: "I had a look with our sys admin, he turned on cloud flare which is what we use to make this work in other cases. It didn’t work though, (temporarily broke http too!), he might have some more cycles to look at in a little while."

from groovy-eclipse.

So the main update site is actually built as a redirect to the versioned update site. Below is the content for http://dist.springsource.org/release/GRECLIPSE/e4.10/compositeContent.xml Do you expect the redirect to be https as well?

<repository name="Groovy Eclipse Latest Release for Eclipse e4.10" type="org.eclipse.equinox.internal.p2.metadata.repository.CompositeMetadataRepository" version="1.0.0">
 <properties size="1">
 <property name="p2.timestamp" value="1515114810753"/>
 </properties>
 <children size="1">
 <child location="http://dist.springsource.org/release/GRECLIPSE/3.2.0/e4.10"/>
 </children>
</repository>

from groovy-eclipse.

I updated our pom to use https where possible. If the springsource.org site(s) can be made to support https, I'll make sure the composite site xml redirects to https as well.

from groovy-eclipse.

@eric-milles This is still not fixed in the repository.

Source Locations

Vulnerability

CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check

The build files indicate that this project is resolving dependencies over HTTP instead of HTTPS. Any of these artifacts could have been MITM to maliciously compromise them and infect the build artifacts that were produced. Additionally, if any of these JARs or other dependencies were compromised, any developers using these could continue to be infected past updating to fix this.

This vulnerability has a CVSS v3.0 Base Score of 8.1/10
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Public Disclosure

This vulnerability needs to be publicly disclosed.

Option 1: File for a CVE

A project maintainer for this project should probably file for a CVE number to inform the public about this vulnerability in the build for this project. The goal is to inform the public that there was a potential for published build artifacts to have been maliciously compromised in earlier releases.

If a maintainer on this project works for or is associated with a CNA, please have them file it with them:
cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html

Otherwise, an open source CVE should be filed for here:
iwantacve.org

Option 2: Manually validate the release artifacts

If this project's build is fully reproducible. An alternative to filing for a CVE is to go back and build the earlier releases (with the HTTPS patch applied) to confirm the artifacts were not tampered when they were built. This can be done by comparing the hashes of the artifacts built locally with the ones published. If the hashes of all previous artifacts match those that are published, you can safely assume that the releases were not tampered with.

Again, this assumes that the build if fully reproducible and will require significantly more work.

from groovy-eclipse.

Update sites should be available via https. Thanks Andy. @nedtwigg @JLLeitschuh Can you give them a try?

from groovy-eclipse.

I can confirm that they work. Thanks Eric!

from groovy-eclipse.